Risk Management Specialist
ISO 14971:2019 risk management implementation throughout the medical device lifecycle.
Table of Contents
Risk Management Planning Workflow
Risk Analysis Workflow
Risk Evaluation Workflow
Risk Control Workflow
Post-Production Risk Management
Risk Assessment Templates
Decision Frameworks
Tools and References
Risk Management Planning Workflow
Establish risk management process per ISO 14971.
Workflow: Create Risk Management Plan
Define scope of risk management activities:
Medical device identification
Lifecycle stages covered
Applicable standards and regulations
Establish risk acceptability criteria:
Define probability categories (P1-P5)
Define severity categories (S1-S5)
Create risk matrix with acceptance thresholds
Assign responsibilities:
Risk management lead
Subject matter experts
Approval authorities
Define verification activities:
Methods for control verification
Acceptance criteria
Plan production and post-production activities:
Information sources
Review triggers
Update procedures
Obtain plan approval
Establish risk management file
Validation: Plan approved; acceptability criteria defined; responsibilities assigned; file established
Risk Management Plan Content
Section
Content
Evidence
Scope
Device and lifecycle coverage
Scope statement
Criteria
Risk acceptability matrix
Risk matrix document
Responsibilities
Roles and authorities
RACI chart
Verification
Methods and acceptance
Verification plan
Production/Post-Production
Monitoring activities
Surveillance plan
Risk Acceptability Matrix (5x5)
Probability \ Severity
Negligible
Minor
Serious
Critical
Catastrophic
Frequent (P5)
Medium
High
High
Unacceptable
Unacceptable
Probable (P4)
Medium
Medium
High
High
Unacceptable
Occasional (P3)
Low
Medium
Medium
High
High
Remote (P2)
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
High
Improbable (P1)
Low
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
Risk Level Actions
Level
Acceptable
Action Required
Low
Yes
Document and accept
Medium
ALARP
Reduce if practicable; document rationale
High
ALARP
Reduction required; demonstrate ALARP
Unacceptable
No
Design change mandatory
Risk Analysis Workflow
Identify hazards and estimate risks systematically.
Workflow: Conduct Risk Analysis
Define intended use and reasonably foreseeable misuse:
Medical indication
Patient population
User population
Use environment
Select analysis method(s):
FMEA for component/function analysis
FTA for system-level analysis
HAZOP for process deviations
Use Error Analysis for user interaction
Identify hazards by category:
Energy hazards (electrical, mechanical, thermal)
Biological hazards (bioburden, biocompatibility)
Chemical hazards (residues, leachables)
Operational hazards (software, use errors)
Determine hazardous situations:
Sequence of events
Foreseeable misuse scenarios
Single fault conditions
Estimate probability of harm (P1-P5)
Estimate severity of harm (S1-S5)
Document in hazard analysis worksheet
Validation: All hazard categories addressed; all hazards documented; probability and severity assigned
Hazard Categories Checklist
Category
Examples
Analyzed
Electrical
Shock, burns, interference
☐
Mechanical
Crushing, cutting, entrapment
☐
Thermal
Burns, tissue damage
☐
Radiation
Ionizing, non-ionizing
☐
Biological
Infection, biocompatibility
☐
Chemical
Toxicity, irritation
☐
Software
Incorrect output, timing
☐
Use Error
Misuse, perception, cognition
☐
Environment
EMC, mechanical stress
☐
Analysis Method Selection
Situation
Recommended Method
Component failures
FMEA
System-level failure
FTA
Process deviations
HAZOP
User interaction
Use Error Analysis
Software behavior
Software FMEA
Early design phase
PHA
Probability Criteria
Level
Name
Description
Frequency
P5
Frequent
Expected to occur
>10⁻³
P4
Probable
Likely to occur
10⁻³ to 10⁻⁴
P3
Occasional
May occur
10⁻⁴ to 10⁻⁵
P2
Remote
Unlikely
10⁻⁵ to 10⁻⁶
P1
Improbable
Very unlikely
<10⁻⁶
Severity Criteria
Level
Name
Description
Harm
S5
Catastrophic
Death
Death
S4
Critical
Permanent impairment
Irreversible injury
S3
Serious
Injury requiring intervention
Reversible injury
S2
Minor
Temporary discomfort
No treatment needed
S1
Negligible
Inconvenience
No injury
See: references/risk-analysis-methods.md
Risk Evaluation Workflow
Evaluate risks against acceptability criteria.
Workflow: Evaluate Identified Risks
Calculate initial risk level from probability × severity
Compare to risk acceptability criteria
For each risk, determine:
Acceptable: Document and accept
ALARP: Proceed to risk control
Unacceptable: Mandatory risk control
Document evaluation rationale
Identify risks requiring benefit-risk analysis
Complete benefit-risk analysis if applicable
Compile risk evaluation summary
Validation: All risks evaluated; acceptability determined; rationale documented
Risk Evaluation Decision Tree
Copy Risk Estimated
│
▼
Apply Acceptability Criteria
│
├── Low Risk ──────────► Accept and document
│
├── Medium Risk ───────► Consider risk reduction
│ │ Document ALARP if not reduced
│ ▼
│ Practicable to reduce?
│ │
│ Yes──► Implement control
│ No───► Document ALARP rationale
│
├── High Risk ─────────► Risk reduction required
│ │ Must demonstrate ALARP
│ ▼
│ Implement control
│ Verify residual risk
│
└── Unacceptable ──────► Design change mandatory
Cannot proceed without control
ALARP Demonstration Requirements
Criterion
Evidence Required
Technical feasibility
Analysis of alternative controls
Proportionality
Cost-benefit of further reduction
State of the art
Comparison to similar devices
Stakeholder input
Clinical/user perspectives
Benefit-Risk Analysis Triggers
Situation
Benefit-Risk Required
Residual risk remains high
Yes
No feasible risk reduction
Yes
Novel device
Yes
Unacceptable risk with clinical benefit
Yes
All risks low
No
Risk Control Workflow
Implement and verify risk control measures.
Workflow: Implement Risk Controls
Identify risk control options:
Inherent safety by design (Priority 1)
Protective measures in device (Priority 2)
Information for safety (Priority 3)
Select optimal control following hierarchy
Analyze control for new hazards introduced
Document control in design requirements
Implement control in design
Develop verification protocol
Execute verification and document results
Evaluate residual risk with control in place
Validation: Control implemented; verification passed; residual risk acceptable; no unaddressed new hazards
Risk Control Hierarchy
Priority
Control Type
Examples
Effectiveness
1
Inherent Safety
Eliminate hazard, fail-safe design
Highest
2
Protective Measures
Guards, alarms, automatic shutdown
High
3
Information
Warnings, training, IFU
Lower
Risk Control Option Analysis Template
Copy RISK CONTROL OPTION ANALYSIS
Hazard ID: H-[XXX]
Hazard: [Description]
Initial Risk: P[X] × S[X] = [Level]
OPTIONS CONSIDERED:
| Option | Control Type | New Hazards | Feasibility | Selected |
|--------|--------------|-------------|-------------|----------|
| 1 | [Type] | [Yes/No] | [H/M/L] | [Yes/No] |
| 2 | [Type] | [Yes/No] | [H/M/L] | [Yes/No] |
SELECTED CONTROL: Option [X]
Rationale: [Justification for selection]
IMPLEMENTATION:
- Requirement: [REQ-XXX]
- Design Document: [Reference]
VERIFICATION:
- Method: [Test/Analysis/Review]
- Protocol: [Reference]
- Acceptance Criteria: [Criteria]
Risk Control Verification Methods
Method
When to Use
Evidence
Test
Quantifiable performance
Test report
Inspection
Physical presence
Inspection record
Analysis
Design calculation
Analysis report
Review
Documentation check
Review record
Residual Risk Evaluation
After Control
Action
Acceptable
Document, proceed
ALARP achieved
Document rationale, proceed
Still unacceptable
Additional control or design change
New hazard introduced
Analyze and control new hazard
Post-Production Risk Management
Monitor and update risk management throughout product lifecycle.
Workflow: Post-Production Risk Monitoring
Identify information sources:
Customer complaints
Service reports
Vigilance/adverse events
Literature monitoring
Clinical studies
Establish collection procedures
Define review triggers:
New hazard identified
Increased frequency of known hazard
Serious incident
Regulatory feedback
Analyze incoming information for risk relevance
Update risk management file as needed
Communicate significant findings
Conduct periodic risk management review
Validation: Information sources monitored; file current; reviews completed per schedule
Information Sources
Source
Information Type
Review Frequency
Complaints
Use issues, failures
Continuous
Service
Field failures, repairs
Monthly
Vigilance
Serious incidents
Immediate
Literature
Similar device issues
Quarterly
Regulatory
Authority feedback
As received
Clinical
PMCF data
Per plan
Risk Management File Update Triggers
Trigger
Response Time
Action
Serious incident
Immediate
Full risk review
New hazard identified
30 days
Risk analysis update
Trend increase
60 days
Trend analysis
Design change
Before implementation
Impact assessment
Standards update
Per transition period
Gap analysis
Periodic Review Requirements
Review Element
Frequency
Risk management file completeness
Annual
Risk control effectiveness
Annual
Post-market information analysis
Quarterly
Risk-benefit conclusions
Annual or on new data
Risk Assessment Templates
Hazard Analysis Worksheet
Copy HAZARD ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
Product: [Device Name]
Document: HA-[Product]-[Rev]
Analyst: [Name]
Date: [Date]
| ID | Hazard | Hazardous Situation | Harm | P | S | Initial Risk | Control | Residual P | Residual S | Final Risk |
|----|--------|---------------------|------|---|---|--------------|---------|------------|------------|------------|
| H-001 | [Hazard] | [Situation] | [Harm] | [1-5] | [1-5] | [Level] | [Control ref] | [1-5] | [1-5] | [Level] |
FMEA Worksheet
Copy FMEA WORKSHEET
Product: [Device Name]
Subsystem: [Subsystem]
Analyst: [Name]
Date: [Date]
| ID | Item | Function | Failure Mode | Effect | S | Cause | O | Control | D | RPN | Action |
|----|------|----------|--------------|--------|---|-------|---|---------|---|-----|--------|
| FM-001 | [Item] | [Function] | [Mode] | [Effect] | [1-10] | [Cause] | [1-10] | [Detection] | [1-10] | [S×O×D] | [Action] |
RPN Action Thresholds:
>200: Critical - Immediate action
100-200: High - Action plan required
50-100: Medium - Consider action
<50: Low - Monitor
Risk Management Report Summary
Copy RISK MANAGEMENT REPORT
Product: [Device Name]
Date: [Date]
Revision: [X.X]
SUMMARY:
- Total hazards identified: [N]
- Risk controls implemented: [N]
- Residual risks: [N] Low, [N] Medium, [N] High
- Overall conclusion: [Acceptable / Not Acceptable]
RISK DISTRIBUTION:
| Risk Level | Before Control | After Control |
|------------|----------------|---------------|
| Unacceptable | [N] | 0 |
| High | [N] | [N] |
| Medium | [N] | [N] |
| Low | [N] | [N] |
CONTROLS IMPLEMENTED:
- Inherent safety: [N]
- Protective measures: [N]
- Information for safety: [N]
OVERALL RESIDUAL RISK: [Acceptable / ALARP Demonstrated]
BENEFIT-RISK CONCLUSION: [If applicable]
APPROVAL:
Risk Management Lead: _____________ Date: _______
Quality Assurance: _____________ Date: _______
Decision Frameworks
Risk Control Selection
Copy What is the risk level?
│
├── Unacceptable ──► Can hazard be eliminated?
│ │
│ Yes─┴─No
│ │ │
│ ▼ ▼
│ Eliminate Can protective
│ hazard measure reduce?
│ │
│ Yes─┴─No
│ │ │
│ ▼ ▼
│ Add Add warning
│ protection + training
│
└── High/Medium ──► Apply hierarchy
starting at Level 1
New Hazard Analysis
Question
If Yes
If No
Does control introduce new hazard?
Analyze new hazard
Proceed
Is new risk higher than original?
Reject control option
Acceptable trade-off
Can new hazard be controlled?
Add control
Reject control option
Risk Acceptability Decision
Condition
Decision
All risks Low
Acceptable
Medium risks with ALARP
Acceptable
High risks with ALARP documented
Acceptable if benefits outweigh
Any Unacceptable residual
Not acceptable - redesign
Tools and References
Scripts
Tool
Purpose
Usage
risk_matrix_calculator.py
Calculate risk levels and FMEA RPN
python risk_matrix_calculator.py --help
Risk Matrix Calculator Features:
ISO 14971 5x5 risk matrix calculation
FMEA RPN (Risk Priority Number) calculation
Interactive mode for guided assessment
Display risk criteria definitions
JSON output for integration
References
Document
Content
iso14971-implementation-guide.md
Complete ISO 14971:2019 implementation with templates
risk-analysis-methods.md
FMEA, FTA, HAZOP, Use Error Analysis methods
Quick Reference: ISO 14971 Process
Stage
Key Activities
Output
Planning
Define scope, criteria, responsibilities
Risk Management Plan
Analysis
Identify hazards, estimate risk
Hazard Analysis
Evaluation
Compare to criteria, ALARP assessment
Risk Evaluation
Control
Implement hierarchy, verify
Risk Control Records
Residual
Overall assessment, benefit-risk
Risk Management Report
Production
Monitor, review, update
Updated RM File
Related Skills
Skill
Integration Point
quality-manager-qms-iso13485
QMS integration
capa-officer
Risk-based CAPA
regulatory-affairs-head
Regulatory submissions
quality-documentation-manager
Risk file management
AI-Specific Risk Management (ISO 14971 + AI Risk Considerations)
AI/ML Medical Device Risk Categories
Traditional ISO 14971 hazard categories must be extended for AI/ML-based devices:
AI-Specific Hazard
Description
Severity Potential
Detection Difficulty
Model bias
Discriminatory outputs across patient subgroups
S3-S5 (misdiagnosis)
High — requires subgroup analysis
Data drift
Input data distribution shifts from training data
S2-S4 (degraded performance)
Medium — requires monitoring
Concept drift
Clinical ground truth changes over time
S3-S5 (outdated predictions)
High — requires clinical validation
Adversarial inputs
Intentionally crafted inputs to deceive model
S2-S5 (incorrect output)
High — requires adversarial testing
Hallucination/confabulation
Plausible but incorrect outputs
S3-S5 (false diagnosis)
Medium — requires output validation
Training data poisoning
Corrupted training data leads to systematic errors
S3-S5
Very High — requires data provenance
Automation complacency
Users over-trust AI outputs
S3-S5 (missed clinical findings)
Medium — requires human factors study
AI Risk Analysis Methodology
Copy Step 1: AI System Characterization
→ Define intended use, user population, clinical context
→ Classify: locked algorithm vs. adaptive vs. continuously learning
→ Map to SaMD risk framework (IMDRF)
Step 2: AI-Specific Hazard Identification
→ Apply standard ISO 14971 hazard categories
→ ADD: data quality hazards, algorithmic hazards, integration hazards
→ Consider: training data representativeness, edge cases, failure modes
Step 3: AI Failure Mode Analysis
→ Extend FMEA with AI-specific failure modes:
- False positive/negative beyond acceptable rates
- Performance degradation over time
- Out-of-distribution input handling
- Feature importance shift
→ For each failure mode: determine harm pathway to patient
Step 4: AI-Specific Risk Controls
→ Confidence thresholds (reject uncertain predictions)
→ Human-in-the-loop for high-risk decisions
→ Input validation and out-of-distribution detection
→ Continuous performance monitoring with drift detection
→ Automated model retraining safeguards
→ Fail-safe modes when AI system is unavailable
Step 5: AI Risk Monitoring Plan
→ Define performance metrics and acceptable thresholds
→ Establish monitoring frequency (real-time, daily, weekly)
→ Define retraining triggers and validation requirements
→ Plan for model versioning and rollback procedures
AI Risk Acceptability Considerations
Risk Factor
Additional Consideration for AI
Probability
Include statistical confidence intervals for model performance
Severity
Consider both direct harm and harm from delayed correct treatment
Detectability
Factor in opacity of AI decision-making (explainability)
Benefit
Quantify clinical benefit vs. non-AI alternative
ALARP
State-of-the-art includes current AI best practices (GMLP)
Cybersecurity Risk Integration (IEC 81001-5-1)
Health Software Cybersecurity Risk Management
IEC 81001-5-1:2021 establishes cybersecurity lifecycle requirements for health software. Integrate with ISO 14971:
ISO 14971 Stage
IEC 81001-5-1 Integration
Combined Output
Risk Management Plan
Include cybersecurity scope, threat modeling methodology
Combined RM + cybersecurity plan
Hazard identification
Add cybersecurity threat identification (STRIDE, attack trees)
Extended hazard analysis with cyber threats
Risk estimation
Estimate probability based on threat landscape and exploitability
Risk register with cyber-specific likelihood factors
Risk control
Implement security controls as risk mitigations
Controls traceable to both safety and security risks
Residual risk
Evaluate residual cybersecurity risk
Combined residual risk assessment
Post-production
Monitor threat landscape, CVE databases, incident reports
Integrated PMS + security monitoring
Cybersecurity Threat Categories for Medical Devices
Threat Category
Examples
ISO 14971 Harm Pathway
Unauthorized access
Credential theft, privilege escalation
Modification of device settings → patient harm
Data breach
PHI exfiltration, ransomware
Loss of data availability → delayed treatment
Denial of service
Network flooding, resource exhaustion
Device unavailable → delayed diagnosis/treatment
Malware
Ransomware, trojans, supply chain compromise
Device malfunction → incorrect output
Data integrity
Man-in-the-middle, data manipulation
Corrupted clinical data → incorrect treatment
Supply chain
Compromised dependencies, malicious updates
Backdoor access → any harm pathway
Cybersecurity FMEA Extension
Add these columns to standard FMEA for cybersecurity failure modes:
Copy CYBERSECURITY FMEA EXTENSION
| ID | Component | Security Function | Threat | Attack Vector | Exploitability | Impact | S | O | D | RPN | Security Control |
|----|-----------|-------------------|--------|---------------|---------------|--------|---|---|---|-----|-----------------|
| CS-001 | Auth module | User authentication | Credential theft | Phishing | High (8) | Full access | 8 | 6 | 4 | 192 | MFA + session management |
| CS-002 | Data store | Data confidentiality | SQL injection | Network input | Medium (5) | Data breach | 9 | 4 | 3 | 108 | Parameterized queries + WAF |
| CS-003 | Update mechanism | Integrity | Supply chain | Compromised update | Low (3) | Malware install | 10 | 2 | 7 | 140 | Code signing + integrity verification |
Supply Chain Risk Management
Medical Device Supply Chain Risks
Risk Category
Description
Probability
Impact
Control Strategy
Single-source component
Critical component from sole supplier
Medium
Critical
Dual-source qualification, safety stock
Counterfeit components
Fraudulent parts entering supply chain
Low-Medium
Catastrophic
Supplier audits, incoming inspection, chain of custody
Supplier quality failure
Supplier QMS breakdown
Medium
High
Supplier qualification, periodic audits, quality agreements
Software dependency
Vulnerable or unsupported open-source library
High
Medium-High
SBOM management, vulnerability scanning, update policy
Geopolitical disruption
Sanctions, trade restrictions, supply interruption
Low-Medium
High
Geographic diversification, buffer inventory
Raw material shortage
Rare earth, specialty materials unavailability
Low
High
Alternative material qualification, forward contracts
Supply Chain Risk Assessment Workflow
Copy Step 1: Supply Chain Mapping
→ Identify all direct suppliers (Tier 1)
→ Map critical Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers
→ Document component criticality (safety-critical, quality-critical, standard)
Step 2: Supplier Risk Scoring
→ Quality risk: past performance, certification status, audit results
→ Financial risk: stability, dependency on your business
→ Geographic risk: natural disaster, political stability
→ Cyber risk: supplier's information security posture
→ Concentration risk: single-source, regional concentration
Step 3: Risk Treatment
→ Critical suppliers: quality agreements, annual audits, dual-sourcing
→ High-risk suppliers: enhanced monitoring, contingency plans
→ Medium-risk suppliers: periodic review, performance metrics
→ Low-risk suppliers: standard purchasing controls
Step 4: Ongoing Monitoring
→ Supplier scorecard tracking (quality, delivery, responsiveness)
→ Annual supplier risk reassessment
→ Trigger-based reassessment (quality event, financial change, M&A)
Post-Market Risk Monitoring Automation
Automated Signal Detection
Data Source
Automation Approach
Alert Threshold
Complaint database
Statistical process control (SPC) charts on complaint rates
>2 sigma deviation from baseline
Adverse event reports
NLP-based classification + trend analysis
Any serious event; trend >3x baseline
Literature monitoring
Automated PubMed/regulatory database searches
New publication on similar device adverse events
Field service data
Automated failure rate tracking
Failure rate exceeds design MTBF by >20%
Social media/forums
Keyword monitoring for device-related complaints
Cluster of similar complaints in 30-day window
Regulatory databases
MAUDE, EUDAMED vigilance module, BfArM monitoring
New recall or safety communication for similar device
Risk Management File Update Automation
Copy Automated Trigger → Risk Review Decision Tree
New complaint received
→ Classify by hazard category (auto or manual)
→ Check: Known hazard?
YES → Update frequency data → Recalculate risk level
→ Risk level changed? → Flag for risk management review
NO → New hazard identified → Initiate risk analysis
→ Estimate initial risk → Determine controls needed
→ Update risk management file
Trend threshold exceeded
→ Generate trend report with statistical analysis
→ Convene risk management review within 30 days
→ Update risk management file with new probability estimates
→ Evaluate if additional risk controls needed
→ If safety issue: initiate FSCA/field action assessment
Cross-Reference: NIST Cybersecurity Framework Risk Assessment
Map ISO 14971 risk management to NIST CSF 2.0 for comprehensive risk coverage:
ISO 14971 Process
NIST CSF 2.0 Function
Integration Point
Hazard identification
Identify (ID.RA)
Combine clinical and cyber threat identification
Risk estimation
Identify (ID.RA-03, ID.RA-04)
Unified likelihood and impact scales
Risk evaluation
Identify (ID.RA-05, ID.RA-06)
Single risk register with combined acceptance criteria
Risk control
Protect (PR), Detect (DE)
Security controls as risk mitigations
Residual risk evaluation
Govern (GV.RM)
Combined residual risk statement
Post-production monitoring
Detect (DE.CM, DE.AE)
Unified monitoring for safety and security events
See also: ../information-security-manager-iso27001/SKILL.md for ISO 27001 security controls that serve as risk mitigations.
Cross-Reference: DORA ICT Risk Management
For medical device companies operating as or supplying to financial entities in the EU, the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA, Regulation 2022/2554) adds ICT risk requirements:
DORA Requirement
ISO 14971 Integration
Action
ICT risk management framework (Art. 6)
Extend risk management plan to include ICT risks
Add ICT-specific risk categories to hazard analysis
ICT incident management (Art. 17)
Align with post-production monitoring
Unified incident classification and response
Digital operational resilience testing (Art. 24-27)
Complement risk control verification
Include penetration testing in verification activities
Third-party ICT risk (Art. 28-30)
Extend supply chain risk management
Assess ICT service providers per DORA requirements
Information sharing (Art. 45)
Enhance post-market information sources
Participate in threat intelligence sharing arrangements
Enhanced FMEA with Cybersecurity Failure Modes
Combined Safety-Security FMEA Template
Copy COMBINED SAFETY-SECURITY FMEA
Product: [Device Name]
Subsystem: [Subsystem]
Date: [Date]
TRADITIONAL SAFETY FAILURE MODES:
| ID | Item | Function | Failure Mode | Effect | S | Cause | O | Detection | D | RPN | Control |
|----|------|----------|--------------|--------|---|-------|---|-----------|---|-----|---------|
| FM-001 | Sensor | Measure vital sign | Incorrect reading | Wrong diagnosis | 8 | Calibration drift | 4 | Self-test | 3 | 96 | Auto-calibration |
CYBERSECURITY FAILURE MODES:
| ID | Asset | Security Objective | Threat | Attack Vector | Exploitability (O) | Impact (S) | Detection (D) | RPN | Security Control |
|----|-------|-------------------|--------|---------------|-------------------|-----------|---------------|-----|-----------------|
| CS-001 | Sensor data | Integrity | Data manipulation | MITM attack | 3 | 8 | 5 | 120 | TLS + data signing |
| CS-002 | Firmware | Integrity | Malicious update | Supply chain | 2 | 10 | 6 | 120 | Secure boot + code signing |
| CS-003 | User interface | Availability | DoS attack | Network flooding | 5 | 6 | 4 | 120 | Rate limiting + redundancy |
AI/ML FAILURE MODES (if applicable):
| ID | Component | ML Function | Failure Mode | Clinical Effect | S | Cause | O | Detection | D | RPN | ML Control |
|----|-----------|-------------|--------------|----------------|---|-------|---|-----------|---|-----|-----------|
| AI-001 | Classifier | Diagnose condition | False negative | Missed diagnosis | 9 | Distribution shift | 4 | Performance monitoring | 5 | 180 | Drift detection + human review |
| AI-002 | Classifier | Diagnose condition | Biased output | Health disparity | 8 | Unrepresentative training data | 3 | Subgroup analysis | 6 | 144 | Fairness constraints + diverse data |
COMBINED RPN THRESHOLDS:
>200: Critical — Immediate action required (all categories)
100-200: High — Action plan within 30 days
50-100: Medium — Monitor and consider action
<50: Low — Accept and monitor
Cybersecurity-Safety Interaction Analysis
Safety Control
Cybersecurity Impact
Mitigation
Alarm system
Alarm suppression via unauthorized access
Access control + alarm integrity monitoring
Fail-safe mode
Denial of service forcing perpetual safe mode
Rate limiting + redundant communication
Software update
Malicious update compromising safety function
Code signing + dual authorization + rollback capability
Data logging
Log tampering concealing safety events
Append-only logs + cryptographic integrity
User authentication
Lockout preventing emergency use
Break-glass procedures + local override
Enhanced Risk Management — AI, Cybersecurity & Cross-Framework Integration
AI-Specific Risk Management
When managing risk for AI/ML medical devices, extend ISO 14971 with:
AI Model Risk: Training data bias, model drift, adversarial attacks, explainability gaps
Performance Degradation: Monitor for distribution shift, concept drift, and data quality issues
Algorithmic Bias: Demographic parity, equalized odds, calibration across subgroups
Human-AI Interaction Risks: Over-reliance, automation bias, alert fatigue, trust calibration
Cross-reference: See eu-ai-act-specialist for EU AI Act risk classification
Cybersecurity Risk Integration (IEC 81001-5-1)
Health Software Cybersecurity: IEC 81001-5-1 extends ISO 14971 for cybersecurity
Threat Modeling: STRIDE methodology applied to medical device architecture
Cybersecurity FMEA: Failure modes include unauthorized access, data breach, ransomware, supply chain attack
Vulnerability Management: CVSS scoring integrated with ISO 14971 severity/probability matrix
Cross-reference: See infrastructure-compliance-auditor for technical security checks
Supply Chain Risk Management
Component Risk: Third-party software vulnerabilities (SBOM-based assessment)
Supplier Risk: Single-source dependencies, geopolitical risks, quality history
Cloud Risk: Data residency, service availability, vendor lock-in
Cross-reference: See nis2-directive-specialist for NIS2 supply chain requirements
Cross-Framework Risk Mapping
Risk Area
ISO 14971
NIST CSF 2.0
DORA
NIS2
Risk Assessment
Clause 4
ID.RA
Art. 6
Art. 21.1
Risk Treatment
Clause 7
PR (all)
Art. 9
Art. 21.2
Monitoring
Clause 9
DE.CM
Art. 10
Art. 21.2.f
Incident Response
Clause 9
RS.MA
Art. 17
Art. 23
Continuous Improvement
Clause 10
ID.IM
Art. 13
Art. 21.2.f
Troubleshooting
Problem
Likely Cause
Resolution
Risk matrix calculator returns "Invalid probability"
Probability value outside 1-5 range
Use integers 1-5 for probability (--probability) and 1-5 for severity (--severity). Run --list-criteria to display the full scale definitions.
FMEA RPN calculation produces unexpected results
Severity, occurrence, or detection values outside 1-10 range
FMEA mode (--fmea) requires --severity, --occurrence, and --detection values each in the 1-10 range. Values outside this range produce unreliable RPNs.
Risk level shows "Medium" but stakeholders expect "High"
Risk acceptability criteria differ from the tool's default 5x5 matrix
The default matrix follows common ISO 14971 practice. If your organization uses a custom risk matrix, adjust the risk acceptability criteria in your Risk Management Plan and document deviations.
Post-production risk data not triggering file updates
Review triggers not defined or too narrow
Define explicit triggers: any serious incident (immediate), new hazard identification (30 days), trend increase (60 days), design change (before implementation), and standards update (per transition period).
AI-specific hazards not captured in FMEA
Standard FMEA template lacks AI failure modes
Extend the FMEA with AI-specific failure modes: model bias, data drift, concept drift, adversarial inputs, automation complacency. Use the AI Risk Analysis Methodology section as a guide.
Cybersecurity threats not integrated into risk assessment
Threat modeling methodology not aligned to ISO 14971
Use STRIDE methodology for threat identification, then map each threat to an ISO 14971 harm pathway. Reference IEC 81001-5-1 for health software cybersecurity integration.
Benefit-risk analysis requested but no template available
The tool calculates risk levels but does not generate benefit-risk documents
The benefit-risk analysis is a narrative document per ISO 14971 Clause 8. Use the risk matrix outputs as quantitative inputs, then document clinical benefits vs. residual risks in the Risk Management Report.
Success Criteria
Risk Management Plan approved with defined scope, risk acceptability matrix, RACI chart, and post-production monitoring plan before design input phase
100% of ISO 14971 hazard categories analyzed (electrical, mechanical, thermal, radiation, biological, chemical, software, use error, environmental) with documented rationale for each
All identified risks evaluated against the 5x5 acceptability matrix with no uncontrolled "Unacceptable" residual risks remaining
Risk controls implemented following the priority hierarchy (inherent safety first, then protective measures, then information for safety) with verification records for every control
Overall residual risk evaluated as acceptable or ALARP demonstrated, with benefit-risk analysis completed for any residual risks remaining in High territory
Post-production risk monitoring operational with defined information sources, review triggers, and a documented process for updating the Risk Management File
For AI/ML devices: AI-specific risk categories (bias, drift, adversarial inputs) assessed per BS/AAMI 34971:2023 or equivalent, with continuous performance monitoring thresholds defined
Scope & Limitations
In Scope:
ISO 14971:2019 risk management process implementation (planning, analysis, evaluation, control, residual risk, production/post-production)
5x5 risk matrix calculation and FMEA RPN scoring
Hazard analysis methodology guidance (FMEA, FTA, HAZOP, Use Error Analysis, PHA)
Risk control hierarchy application and verification planning
Benefit-risk analysis framework
Post-production risk monitoring and risk file update triggers
AI/ML-specific risk management extensions (model bias, drift, adversarial inputs)
Cybersecurity risk integration per IEC 81001-5-1
Supply chain risk assessment methodology
Cross-framework risk mapping (ISO 14971, NIST CSF, DORA, NIS2)
Out of Scope:
Clinical investigation design or execution (risk management informs clinical strategy but does not execute studies)
Software hazard analysis per IEC 62304 (the skill references software risk but detailed software lifecycle management requires IEC 62304 expertise)
Biocompatibility testing or ISO 10993 evaluation (the skill identifies biological hazards but does not execute biocompatibility testing)
Cybersecurity penetration testing or vulnerability scanning (use infrastructure-compliance-auditor for technical security testing)
CAPA root cause analysis execution (use capa-officer for 5-Why, Fishbone, FTA, FMEA-based root cause investigation)
Regulatory submission of risk management files (use regulatory-affairs-head for submission strategy and packaging)
Integration Points
Skill
Integration
quality-manager-qms-iso13485
Risk management (Clause 7.1) integrates with QMS product realization planning; risk file is part of the Design History File
capa-officer
Post-market risk signals may trigger CAPA; CAPA root cause analysis methods (FMEA, FTA) overlap with risk analysis techniques
regulatory-affairs-head
Risk management file is required for FDA submissions and EU MDR Technical Documentation; benefit-risk analysis supports clinical evaluation
quality-documentation-manager
Risk management file and records must be controlled per document control procedures (Clause 4.2)
fda-consultant-specialist
FDA cybersecurity guidance (2025 update) requires integration of security risks into ISO 14971 processes for premarket submissions
infrastructure-compliance-auditor
Technical security controls validated by the infrastructure auditor serve as risk mitigations for cybersecurity threats in the risk assessment
nist-csf-specialist
NIST CSF risk assessment (ID.RA) maps to ISO 14971 hazard identification and risk estimation; unified risk register possible
Tool Reference
risk_matrix_calculator.py
Calculates ISO 14971 risk levels and FMEA Risk Priority Numbers.
Flag
Required
Description
--probability
Yes (for ISO 14971 mode)
Probability level (1-5): 1=Improbable, 2=Remote, 3=Occasional, 4=Probable, 5=Frequent
--severity
Yes (for both modes)
Severity level: 1-5 for ISO 14971 mode, 1-10 for FMEA mode
--fmea
No
Switch to FMEA RPN calculation mode (requires --severity, --occurrence, --detection)
--occurrence
Yes (for FMEA mode)
Occurrence rating (1-10) for FMEA RPN calculation
--detection
Yes (for FMEA mode)
Detection rating (1-10) for FMEA RPN calculation
--interactive
No
Launch interactive mode for guided risk assessment
--list-criteria
No
Display probability, severity, and risk level criteria definitions