Skill: REENTRANCY_ANALYSIS

Trigger: REENTRANCY flag detected (dynamic dispatch, closures, dispatchable FA, function values) Used by: Breadth agents, depth-state-trace Covers: Cross-module reentrancy via closures, dispatchable FA hook reentrancy, direct/indirect reentrancy, resource lock gaps

Purpose

Audit reentrancy vectors in Aptos Move. Historically, Move's linear type system and static dispatch prevented reentrancy. Post Move 2.2, function values (closures) and dispatchable FungibleAsset hooks introduce dynamic dispatch, creating reentrancy surfaces analogous to EVM callbacks but with different mechanics and mitigations.

Background: Aptos Reentrancy Model

Pre Move 2.2: No dynamic dispatch. All function calls are statically resolved at compile time. Reentrancy was architecturally impossible (no callbacks, no external calls to untrusted code).

Post Move 2.2: Two reentrancy vectors exist:

1. Function values / closures: |arg| { body } syntax allows passing executable code as parameters. A module calling a user-supplied closure can be reentered.
2. Dispatchable FungibleAsset hooks: withdraw, deposit, and derived_balance hooks execute external module code during FA operations. This is framework-level dynamic dispatch.

#[module_lock]: Prevents INDIRECT reentrancy (cross-module reentry into the locked module). Does NOT prevent DIRECT reentrancy (closure calling back into the same module's function within the same execution frame).

Methodology

STEP 1: Dynamic Dispatch Point Inventory

Find ALL uses of dynamic dispatch in the audited modules:

1a. Function Values and Closures

MANDATORY SEARCH: Grep all .move files for:

1. | followed by parameter patterns (closure syntax: |x| { ... }, |x, y| { ... })
2. Function types in signatures (e.g., callback: |u64| -> u64, FunctionValue)
3. move | (move closures that capture variables)
4. Functions that accept function-typed parameters

1b. Dispatchable FA Hooks

MANDATORY SEARCH: Grep for:

1. dispatchable_fungible_asset module usage
2. register_dispatch_functions or equivalent hook registration
3. withdraw_with_*, deposit_with_* function patterns
4. derived_balance implementations

STEP 2: Module Lock Analysis

For each module containing dynamic dispatch points:

CRITICAL DISTINCTION:

• #[module_lock] = YES: Indirect reentrancy blocked (Module A -> closure -> Module A's function). Direct reentrancy still possible (within same function frame, closure calls same module's public function via friend or inline).
• #[module_lock] = NO: Both direct and indirect reentrancy possible.

Check: For each module WITHOUT #[module_lock]:

1. Does it have any dynamic dispatch points (from Step 1)?
2. If YES: cross-module reentrancy is possible - trace all paths.

STEP 3: Third-Party Resource Lock Bypass

If the audited module stores data in a third-party resource abstraction:

Pattern: Module A stores its accounting data in a SmartTable (from aptos_std). aptos_std may have #[module_lock]. But this lock only prevents reentry into aptos_std - it does NOT prevent reentry into Module A. An attacker can reenter Module A while Module A's SmartTable operation is in progress.

Check: Does the protocol rely on a third-party module's lock for its own reentrancy protection? If YES -> FINDING.

STEP 4: State Consistency Analysis (Check-Effect-Interaction)

For each dynamic dispatch point identified in Step 1:

4a. Pre-Dispatch State Snapshot

4b. Reentrancy Impact Trace

For each dispatch point where state is modified before dispatch:

1. Function entry: Read state S1 (e.g., user_balance = 100)
2. Modify state: S1 partially updated (e.g., user_balance -= 50, but total_supply not yet updated)
3. Dynamic dispatch: closure/hook executes
4. REENTRY: Attacker calls back into same module
5. Reentrant call reads: S1 (modified) - sees user_balance = 50
6. Reentrant call reads: S2 (NOT yet modified) - sees stale total_supply = 1000 (should be 950)
7. Inconsistency: S1 and S2 are out of sync
8. Original execution resumes: modifies S2 (total_supply = 950)
9. Impact: [describe what the attacker gained]

Key question for each dispatch point: Is there ANY pair of state variables (S1, S2) where S1 is updated before dispatch but S2 is updated after? If YES, the reentrant call sees an inconsistent state.

STEP 5: Dispatchable FA Specific Reentrancy

If the protocol uses dispatchable FungibleAsset:

5a. Withdraw Hook Reentrancy

// Framework calls this DURING withdrawal:
fun withdraw_hook(store: Object<FungibleStore>, amount: u64, ...) {
    // This code runs AFTER the framework has decided to withdraw
    // but potentially BEFORE the calling module's post-withdrawal logic

    // Can this hook call back into the protocol?
    // What state has been partially modified at this point?
}

Trace: What is the call stack at the point the withdraw hook fires?

1. Protocol function (e.g., redeem())
2. Framework fungible_asset::withdraw()
3. Hook: module::withdraw_hook()
4. Hook can call: ??? (any public function accessible)

5b. Deposit Hook Blocking

Can a deposit hook selectively revert to block specific operations?

• If protocol performs a transfer (withdraw from A + deposit to B), can the deposit hook on B prevent the entire operation?
• Can this be used to grief liquidations, reward distributions, or time-sensitive operations?

5c. Balance Query Reentrancy

If derived_balance hook is registered:

• Does calling fungible_asset::balance() trigger external code?
• Can this external code modify state that the caller depends on?
• Is balance() called within a state modification sequence? (read-modify-write pattern where read triggers hook)

STEP 6: Mitigation Recommendations Framework

For each reentrancy vector found, categorize the recommended fix:

Key Questions (Must Answer All)

1. Dynamic dispatch: Does the module use function values, closures, or dispatchable FA hooks?
2. Module lock: Is #[module_lock] applied? What does it cover vs not cover?
3. State ordering: For each dispatch point, is all state fully updated before the dispatch?
4. Third-party reliance: Does the module rely on another module's lock for its own safety?
5. Hook surface: If dispatchable FA, which hooks are registered and who controls them?

Common False Positives

1. No dynamic dispatch: If the module has zero closure parameters, zero function values, and does not use dispatchable FA, reentrancy is not possible in Move
2. Read-only callbacks: If the closure only reads state (no borrow_global_mut, no state writes), reentrancy cannot cause inconsistency
3. Framework-only hooks: If hooks are registered by the framework and not by user-controllable code, the hook code is trusted
4. Module lock + no direct reentry: If #[module_lock] is present AND the closure does not call the same module's functions, reentrancy is fully blocked
5. Atomic transactions: Move transactions are atomic - partial state is never visible cross-transaction (only within the same transaction via reentrancy)

Output Schema

## Finding [RE-N]: Title

**Verdict**: CONFIRMED / PARTIAL / REFUTED / CONTESTED
**Step Execution**: ✓1,2,3,4,5,6 | ✗N(reason) | ?N(uncertain)
**Rules Applied**: [R4:✓/✗, R10:✓/✗, R12:✓/✗]
**Severity**: Critical/High/Medium/Low/Info
**Location**: module_name.move:LineN

**Reentrancy Type**: DIRECT / INDIRECT / HOOK_BASED / THIRD_PARTY_BYPASS
**Dispatch Point**: {function:line where dynamic dispatch occurs}
**Inconsistent State**: {which state variables are out of sync during callback}

**Description**: What's wrong
**Impact**: What can happen (double-spend, state corruption, fund theft)
**Evidence**: Code showing the dispatch point and state ordering

### Attack Sequence
1. [Attacker calls function X]
2. [State S1 is modified]
3. [Dynamic dispatch triggers callback]
4. [Callback reenters function Y which reads stale S2]
5. [Impact: ...]

### Precondition Analysis (if PARTIAL/REFUTED)
**Missing Precondition**: [What blocks exploitation]
**Precondition Type**: STATE / ACCESS / TIMING / EXTERNAL / BALANCE

### Postcondition Analysis (if CONFIRMED/PARTIAL)
**Postconditions Created**: [What conditions this creates]
**Postcondition Types**: [List applicable types]
**Who Benefits**: [Who can use these]

Step Execution Checklist (MANDATORY)

If any step skipped, document valid reason (N/A, no dynamic dispatch, no dispatchable FA, module lock covers all paths).